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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
~IETROPOLITAN INVESTMENT I 
COMPANY, a Partnership composed 
of W. ADRIAN WRIGHT, W. 
~lEEKS WIRTHLIN, and A. P. 
NEILSON, Plaintiff-Respondent~\\ Ca;:2~o. 
vs. 
JERRY SINE and DORA T. SINE, 
his wife, Defendants-Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
COMES NOW METROPOLITAN INVEST-
~IEN'l' COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent here-
in, and respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for 
a rehearing in the above .. entitled case, and to vacate the 
Order of this. Court herein reversing the judgment for 
Respondent with instructions to the trial court to write 
findings in accordance with the opinion of this Honor-
able Court. 
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This ·Petition is based on the following grounds: 
POINT I 
THIS COURT INCORRECTLY DETER-
MINED THIS TO BE A CASE IN EQUITY 
AND THAT TI-IE FINDING OF THE TRIAL 
COURT MUST BE SUPPORTED BY CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT ERRORED IN FAILING 
TO FIND THAT THE FINDINGS AND 
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT WERE 
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT AND ADE-
QUATE EVIDENCE. 
BRANT H. WALL and JACKSON B. HOWARD 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR 
REHEARING 
POINT I 
THIS COURT INCORRECTLY DETER-
MINED THIS TO BE A CASE IN EQUITY 
AND THAT THE FINDING OF THE TRIAL 
COURT MUST BE SUPPORTED BY CLEAR 
AND CON,TINCING EVIDENCE. 
2-. 
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The opinion rendered by this Court is predicated 
upon the following statement in its decision: 
"'rhe facts which the trial court found in sup-
port of the nullification of the restrictive cove-
nant are facts which require clear and convincing 
eYidence to support such findings.l This is an 
equity case in which we review the trial court's 
findings of fact but overturn them only where 
it is Inanifest that the trial court has misapplied 
proven facts or made findings clearly against the 
weight of the evidence. "2 
1. See Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P. 2d 981. 
2. See Constitution of Utah Article VIII, Sec. 9; O'Gara v. Findlay, 
6 Utah 2d 102, 306 P.2d 1073." 
We believe this statement and rule to be contra 
to the established law and prior holdings of this Court, 
as the rule heretofore established and announced by 
this Court is that an action to quiet title is an action at 
law and is not an action in equity and hence the scope 
of review is limited. In support of this proposal and 
rule, we cite the following: 
In Babcock v. Dangerfield, 98 Utah 10, 94 P.2d 
862, this Court held: 
" * * * It is clear from the pleadings in this 
case that the action is one at law and therefore 
that a jury trial should have been granted. Bo-
lognese Y. Anderson, Utah, 90 P .2d 27 5. See 
also Nor back Y. Board of Directors, 84 Utah 506, 
37 p .2d 339." 
The above case was cited with approval in Dahnken 
Y. George Romney & Sons Co., Ill Utah 471, 184 P.2d 
211. 
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In Buckley v. Cox, 122 Utah 151, 247 P.2d 277, 
in an action by the Plaintiff to quiet title to a driveway 
in herself, the Defendant claimed that the driveway 
was appurtenant to his land and claimed to own it, this 
Court held: 
"Under the criteria set out in Nor back v. 
Board of Directors, 84 Utah 506, 37 P .2d 339, 
this action is one at law. Hence, if there is any 
competent evidence in the record to support the 
court's findings, the judgment should not be dis-
turbed. Brown v. Union Pac. R. Co., 76 Utah 
475, 290 Pac. 759; Jenkins v. Stephens, 64 Utah 
307, 231 P. 112. This principle is well stated in 
Jensen v. Gerrard, 85 Utah 481, 39 P.2d 1070, 
1072: 'As this is a law action, the question is not 
whether the evidence would have supported the 
decision in favor of the appellants, but whether 
the decision made by the trial court finds support 
in the evidence. If there is competent credible 
evidence to support the findings made by the 
trial court, then those findings should stand.' " 
In Holland v. Wilson, 8 Utah 2d 11, 327 P.2d 250, 
this Court cited the case of Babcock v. Dangerfield, 
supra, for the holding that an action to quiet title is 
an action at law, and made the following discussion on 
page 252 Pac. 2d.: 
"'iV e are further of the opinion that although 
historically an action to quiet title was originally 
equitable and the law courts had no jurisdiction 
to grant such relief, that situation does not pre-
vail in this state. Formerly the equity courts 
afforded relief because there was no adequate 
remedy at law. In this jurisdiction, however, 
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there is an adequate remedy provided by statute 
under the provisions of Chapter 40 of Title 78, 
C .C .. A. 1953. Likewise in this state the distinc-
tions between law and equity actions have been 
abolished by Article 'rill, Section 19 of the 
Constitution of Utah." 
And 011 Page 253 P. 2d: 
"In the case of Buckley v. Cox,3 Plaintiff 
brought an action to quiet title in a driveway in 
herself and to enjoin the Defendants from fur-
ther use of the same. This court speaking through 
~Ir. Justice McDonough in an unanimous opin-
ion held that the action was one at law." 
The case before this Court involves an action to 
quiet title to a parcel of real property and the pleadings 
by the Plaintiff follow the provisions of 78-40-1, etc., 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953. Both parties have treated 
and recognized this as such an action, but in many 
instances have cited to this Court decisions from other 
jurisdictions, wherein the action is considered to be one 
in equity and hence certain equitable principles have 
been cited to the Honorable Court. However, the deci-
sion by this Court completely reverses the above cited 
Utah cases without referring to the decisions or recog-
nizing their effect and weight. 
\Ye readily concede that the requirement of proof 
by "clear and convincing evidence" as announced in 
the decision of this Court is well settled and recognized 
in this jurisdiction in actions involving suits to cancel 
or reform a written instrument or actions founded upon 
fraud, deceit or mistake, and in support of this we cite 
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the following cases: See Child v. Child, 8 Utah 261, 
332 P.2d 981; Gray v. Gray, 108 Utah 390, 160 P.2d 
432, and Hansen v. Mutual Finance Corporation, 84 
Utah 579, 37 P.2d 782. 
We respectfully wish to emphasize and point out 
to this Court that the matter now submitted for review 
does not involve any of the foregoing issues and there-
fore the rule announced requiring that the proof and 
evidence be sustained by clear and convincing evidence 
should not be the rule or the degree of evidence in actions 
such as the one now before this Court. We submit that 
there is no evidence in the record or allegation of fraud, 
1nistake, deceit nor of attempt to cancel or reform any 
written instrument. The restrictive covenant, as im-
posed and dictated by the Appellants, constituted a 
cloud upon the title of the subject property and the 
only issue for the trier of facts was to determine the 
validity of same. 'V e respectfully submit that the evi-
dence is sufficient under applicable rules of evidence 
to sustain the findings and judgment that appellants 
have no right, title or interest in and to the subject 
property. We cite for th~ consideraion of this Honor-
able Court in support of the foregoing the following: 
In Buckley v. Cox, this Court held: 
"The evidence as revealed by the record is con-
flicting. It is sufficient to support a decision for 
either party. The trial judge saw and heard all 
the witnesses and viewed the exhibits. He found 
that the use by Defendant was per1nissive and 
not adverse. Since competent evidence in the 
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record supports the court's findings and judg-
rnent, we rnay not disturb the latter. See cases 
supra." 
In Green v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of 
the United States, 3 Utah 2d 375, 284 P.2d 695, this 
Court 1nade the following determination: 
"This being a law action the question is not 
whether the evidence would have supported a 
judgment in favor of Appellant but whether the 
judgment entered by the trial court finds sup-
port in the evidence." 
':V e therefore respecefully submit that the decision 
should be reviewed in the light of the prior holdings 
of this Court and that the proper consideration be given 
to the weight of the evidence and the matters which are 
reviewable by the appellate court. 
POINT II 
THIS COURT ERRORED IN FAILING 
TO FIND THAT THE ~-,INDINGS AND 
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT WERE 
SUPPORTED BY COMPETENT AND ADE-
QUATE EVIDENCE. 
A. There is adequate evidence in the record that 
there has been a substantial change in the neighborhood 
and that the change which has occurred is such as to 
vitiate and render ineffective the restrictive covenant 
involved in this action. 
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At the time the restriction in question was imposed 
in 1956, it is recognized by all parties to this action that 
the area was composed of a few motels, sub-standard 
housing, and some commercial business, but from that 
date to the date of trial, a large number of motels has 
been constructed along the street (R. 27, 28, 29; 30, 21, 
102, 107). The Appellants now concede and admit the 
change in the neighborhood and endeavor to justify 
their position by stating that the development and 
change in the neighborhood is nothing more than the 
change and development that was contemplated by 
the parties, that such change was already in progress 
in 1956, and that the street along which the subject 
property is located is now described as "motel row." 
We are therefore confronted with an issue of fact rela-
tive to change in neighborhood which was submitted 
to the trier of facts and after due consideration and 
weighing of the evidence and testimony, the trial court 
made findings in support of the Respondent's position, 
which findings we believe are supported by adequate 
and competent evidence. 
B. The purposes and objects of the restrictive 
covenant herein involved have been nullified and de-
feated. 
We quote fron1 the Appellants' Brief on pages 3 
and 4 as to the purpose for which the restrictive cove-
nant was imposed: 
"Mr. Jerry Sine was cognizant of the fact that 
A. P. Neilson was interested in motel properties, 
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and he was not willing to sell the subject prop-
erty to anyone who intended to use it in conjunc-
tion with other properties to construct a large 
motel. llis motive for preventing a motel from 
being constructed on the subject property was 
to protect his motel business conducted as Se 
llancho and Scotty's Romney. * * * If a large 
n1otel was erected, in part, on the subject prop-
erty, Appellant feared that the business of Se 
Rancho and Scotty's Romney would be adverse-
ly affected. Guests, especially those traveling 
from the North and South and turning onto 
North Temple Street, would be diverted into 
such motel to the detriment of Se Rancho and 
Scotty's Romney situated to the West thereof. 
(R. 5, 52, 68, 79, 90, 99, 100) ." 
"\tV e quote from the Letter submitted by counsel for 
Appellants dated October 10, 1962, to the Honorable 
Judges of the Supre1ne Court. On page 3 thereof the 
following is stated: 
" * * * It is true that the Appellant testified 
that whether or not the six units which could be 
built on this particular property were built would 
not be substantial (R. 6). But there is no evi-
dence that that was ever within the contempla-
tion of the Appellants. The reason for the re-
striction, as testified by Mr. Sine, was that an 
i1npressiYe front along North Temple Street 
could not be built without this property, which 
would be a substantial thing, and he also testified 
that this would have a substantial effect upon 
his business" (R. 91, 100, and 105; see also R. 
40). 
We submit that the language of the Appellants 
as cited above clearly demonstrates that the sole pur-
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pose for the restrictive covenant was to prevent the 
construction of a large motel on North Temple Street 
between 2nd and 3rd West which might compete with 
the business properties of the Appellants. The purpose 
and object of the restrictive covenant was obviously 
not to prevent the construction of the motel upon the 
small parcel of land involved in this action, which A p-
pellants readily admit could not be utilized for motel 
purposes of any consequence or which would interfere 
with the Appellants' business endeavors. The cardinal 
fact which must be recognized by this Court is that a 
large and impressive motel is to be constructed upon 
the properties surrounding the subject property not-
withstanding the outcome of this litigation (R. 96 and 
Exhibit 9). We submit that the Appellants have ad-
mitted on page 14 of I their Brief that the surrounding 
property could be used for a large and impressive motel 
development even without the use of the subject prop-
erty. Appellants' obvious purpose and object was to 
prevent the construction of a large and impressive 
motel on the surrounding land which they did not own 
nor have any right to control, and consequently, with 
the construction of the motel by Western Travel, Inc., 
of approximately 130 units, there appears to be no 
valid or subsisting reason to continue the existing re-
striction because it no longer has any usefulness nor 
is it capable of serving the purpose for which it was 
intended. Since the area has changed from sub-standard 
housing and light commercial district to a street now 
described as "motel row," and the change has in effect 
10 
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rendered the restriction of no value to the Appellants, 
the findings of the trial court were entirely consistent 
with and supported by the evidence and did not consti-
tute any abuse of discretion or misapplication of the 
evidence, or the law. 
C. The trial court found that for the reasons here-
inabove stated, the restrictive covenant would not con-
fer any benefit upon the Appellants but would con-
stitute only a detriment to the Respondent and hence 
deter1nined that the restrictive covenant should be given 
no further force and effect. In the decision rendered by 
this Honorable Court, it is there stated as the well-
recognized rule of law that: 
"We agree that there is no reason for continu-
ing the restriction unless there is a benefit to be 
realized by the Defendants. Restrictive cove-
nants will not be enforced where enforcement is 
no longer of general usefulness, nor capable of 
serving purpose for which restriction was im-
posed, 6 or reason of restriction has ceased. "7 
6. Osius et al, v. Barton, et al. (Florida, 1933) 147 So. 862. 
7. See also Clark on Covenants and Interests Running With Land, 
pp. 163-165. Dean Pound discussion on Covenants, 33 Harvard 
Law Review, beginning at p. 171." 
The Appellants failed to take an appeal from the 
foregoing finding and the argument of "impressive 
front" as advanced by them in their letter argument of 
October 10, 1962, supra, which was filed after the oral 
argu1nent in this matter and to which Respondent was 
not given an opportunity to rebut, constitutes nothing 
n1ore than a fanciful conclusion on the part of the 
11 
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Appellants. To say that an impressive front cannot 
be constructed on North Temple Street without utiliz-
ing the subject property is clearly without support 
and is refuted by the fact that Western Travel, Inc., 
contemplates the construction of a large motel along 
said street with an impressive front whether the small 
parcel of land, the subject of this litigation, is included 
or not. We invite the Court's attention to the fact that 
the improvements previously located upon the parcel 
of land herein in question have been razed and that the 
land is cleared (R. 31, 106, 107), and therefore to con-
tend that there is any dimunition in the attractiveness 
of the front is merely indulging in argument as to what 
may appeal to the esthetic sense of different individuals 
and in any event, is not manifest in the record by any 
such clear and convincing evidence as would justify or 
warrant overturning the finding of the trial court in 
this regard. Hence, it can be argued and concluded 
just as logically that the proposed new 1notel will be 
designed with a front just as impressive with or without 
utilizing the parcel of property herein involved as a 
part of the area upon which the motel is to be con-
structed. 
The testimony of the architect was to the effect that 
the plans of the motel could be redesigned to delete 
the construction of any 1notel units upon the subject 
parcel of land but that it would present some proble1ns 
with respect to re-aligning and re-routing underlying 
water, sewer, and other utilities (R. 72, 73). 
12 
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\\' e respectfully submit that under any theory the 
retention of the restrictive covenant will fail to confet· 
any reasonable benefit upon the Appellants, that its 
purpose and function has been completely thwarted 
and ruled ineffective, that its retention will not preclude 
the construction of the large motel development, nor 
will it preclude the construction or design of an impres-
sive front as suggested by this Court in its decision. 
\Ye submit that the retention of the covenant will at 
best constitute a harrassment and detriment to the 
Respondent and confer no benefit upon Appellants as 
found by the trial court. 
D. This Court in its decision upsets the findings 
of the lower court to the effect that the restrictive cove-
nant was personal to A. P. Neilson and that it had 
lapsed by the expiration of reasonable time. 
The trial court heard the witnesses and had the 
opportunity to observe their demeanor on the witness 
stand. 'Vhere the evidence is conflicting, the appellate 
court should affirm the findings of the trial court. In 
such circumstances, the trial court is entirely justified 
in disbelieving the testimony of the witness for the Ap-
pellants and giving credence to the testimony offered by 
the witness for Respondent. The application of this 
rule of law is elementary and requires no further dis-
cussion. 
The sole issue before the Court as to the time that 
the restriction is to continue is whether or not its pur-
pose has been terminated by the Ia pse of reasonable 
13 
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time under the circumstances and facts of this case. The 
Appellants contend that it has not lapsed and the 
Respondent contends that it has, that its usefulness 
has been lost for the reasons heretofore announced. We 
believe that the findings of the trial court that the 
change in the neighborhood and the purpose of the 
covenant has been nullified was proper. The deterini-
nation of this Court as to what is a reasonable time 
for this restriction to remain in full force and effect 
was not before the court for determination and should 
not be considered by this Court. 
SUMMARY 
This Court's decision should be reviewed for the 
purpose of determining whether or not this action 
comes within the purview of the prior holdings of this 
Court that actions to quiet title are to be considered as 
actions at law and not actions in equity, and to clearly 
establish whether or not this action falls within that line 
of cases which requires the application of the rule of 
evidence requiring that the findings be supported by 
clear and convincing evidence. 
We respectfully urge this Court to reconsider its 
decision and afford counsel the opportunity of present-
ing these matters in oral argument. The error is too 
obvious to permit of serious doubt. Respondent is 
entitled to an affirmance of the decree and judgment 
rendered by the trial court in this action. 
14 
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Respectfully subtnitted, 
BRANT H. WALL 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
530 Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
JACKSON B. HOWARD, for 
HOWARD and LEWIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
290 North University A venue 
Provo, Utah 
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